LOBBYING | Heike Klüver

summary

This research project offers a comprehensive investigation into the functioning of interest representation and lobbying, focusing on both the German and European contexts. It brings together three interrelated strands of research to better understand why some interest groups wield significant political influence while others do not, how lobbying is structured and regulated, and why interest group mobilization varies across policy domains. The first strand explores the causes and consequences of lobbying and lobbying regulation in Germany. Using a combination of experimental, observational, and data-driven methods, it examines public preferences for lobbying transparency, the effects of disclosure rules on candidate emergence and voter behavior, and the professional backgrounds of lobbyists by linking LinkedIn data with the German lobbying register. It also investigates the democratic implications of “revolving door” lobbying and evaluates the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms such as cooling-off periods. The second strand addresses the puzzle of why some policy sectors are densely populated by interest groups while others remain underrepresented. It develops a theoretical framework tailored to the German political system—building on models developed for the U.S.—and tests its predictions using a novel longitudinal dataset of registered interest groups in Germany from 1974 to 2014. This approach allows for a systematic analysis of the political, institutional, and economic factors that shape patterns of group mobilization. The third strand shifts the analytical lens to the European Union and investigates the conditions under which interest groups are able to influence EU policy-making. Drawing on an original and extensive dataset—including text analysis of European Commission consultations, a large-scale survey of interest groups, and EU legislative data—this research conceptualizes lobbying as an exchange relationship in which European institutions trade influence for valuable resources: information, citizen support, and economic power. Crucially, it demonstrates that lobbying success depends not only on individual groups but also on the capacity of issue-specific lobbying coalitions to collectively provide these resources.

Research in this area has been (partly) funded by:

related publications

2022

Policy Positions, Power and Interest Group-Party Lobby Routines

Elin Haugsgjerd Allern, Heike Klüver, David Marshall, Simon Otjes, Anne Rasmussen, and Christopher Witko

Journal of European Public Policy, Jul 2022

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Prior literature points to the importance of party power and ideology for interest group-party contacts in the legislative arena. But interest groups do not often have ideologies – they are typically active in a small number of policy domains and there may be different parties that share more similar preferences across different policy areas. Therefore, we examine whether and how party power and proximity in policy preferences predict the existence of party-interest group ‘lobby routines’ in specific policy domains, using a novel survey of representative samples of interest groups in seven long-established democracies. We find that groups often form routines with different parties in different policy areas and that preference proximity on relevant policy dimensions is positively associated with having such area-specific lobby routines. However, the results also suggest that powerful parties are more likely allies and that the effect of policy proximity on routines is positively conditioned by power.
@article{haugsgjerd_allern_policy_2022, title = {Policy {Positions}, {Power} and {Interest} {Group}-{Party} {Lobby} {Routines}}, volume = {29}, issn = {1350-1763, 1466-4429}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2021.1912148}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2021.1912148}, language = {en}, number = {7}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, author = {Haugsgjerd Allern, Elin and Klüver, Heike and Marshall, David and Otjes, Simon and Rasmussen, Anne and Witko, Christopher}, month = jul, year = {2022}, pages = {1029--1048}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2020

The Survival of Interest Groups: Evidence from Germany

Heike Klüver

West European Politics, Nov 2020

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Interest groups are important intermediary organisations that function as a transmission belt between societal interests and political decision-makers. However, while some interest groups survive over decades, others only last a few years. This article argues that the survival of interest groups depends on their ability to mobilise resources which is crucially affected by interest group type and the public salience of an interest group’s policy domain. The theoretical expectations are tested based on a novel dataset mapping the survival of 1699 interest groups registered at the German Bundestag between 1974 and 2012. Using event history analysis, it is shown that interest group type and public salience indeed affect whether interest groups survive. Sectional groups last significantly longer than cause groups, and interest group survival increases with the public salience of their policy area. The results have major implications for our understanding of interest groups and political representation in contemporary democracies.
@article{kluver_survival_2020, title = {The {Survival} of {Interest} {Groups}: {Evidence} from {Germany}}, volume = {43}, issn = {0140-2382, 1743-9655}, shorttitle = {The {Survival} of {Interest} {Groups}}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2019.1662634}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1662634}, language = {en}, number = {7}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {West European Politics}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = nov, year = {2020}, pages = {1436--1454}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Q5GGCF}, dataset = {lobbylist}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Setting the Party Agenda: Interest Groups, Voters and Issue Attention

Heike Klüver

British Journal of Political Science, Jul 2020

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Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.
@article{kluver_setting_2020, title = {Setting the {Party} {Agenda}: {Interest} {Groups}, {Voters} and {Issue} {Attention}}, volume = {50}, copyright = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms}, issn = {0007-1234, 1469-2112}, shorttitle = {Setting the {Party} {Agenda}}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007123418000078/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123418000078}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = jul, year = {2020}, pages = {979--1000}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/VVDOUK}, dataset = {lobbylist}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2019

The Influence of Cause and Sectional Group Lobbying on Government Responsiveness

Vincent Hopkins, Heike Klüver, and Mark Pickup

Political Research Quarterly, Sep 2019

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Voters are increasingly concerned that special interests control the policy process. Yet, the literature on representation is more optimistic: elected officials face strong incentives to listen to voters—not just lobby groups—and this makes for more responsive policies. Building on recent work, we argue a more nuanced point: different types of groups have different effects on responsiveness. We show empirically that lobbying from “cause” groups—representing diffuse interests like climate change—strengthens responsiveness, while lobbying from “sectional” groups—representing industry and professional associations—has no observable effect. Our project uses a novel data set of Canadian lobbying registrations spanning fifteen policy areas from 1990 to 2009. Using a dynamic panel model, we test how interest group lobbying moderates the effect of voter issue attention on government spending. Our findings contribute to contemporary debates over the influence of organized groups, suggesting some interest groups may improve representation.
@article{hopkins_influence_2019, title = {The {Influence} of {Cause} and {Sectional} {Group} {Lobbying} on {Government} {Responsiveness}}, volume = {72}, issn = {1065-9129, 1938-274X}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912918796326}, doi = {10.1177/1065912918796326}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {Political Research Quarterly}, author = {Hopkins, Vincent and Klüver, Heike and Pickup, Mark}, month = sep, year = {2019}, pages = {623--636}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/SEY6PL}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Explaining Interest Group Density Across Economic Sectors: Evidence from Germany

Heike Klüver and Elisabeth Zeidler

Political Studies, May 2019

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Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? Interest groups are an important channel through which companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-makers. However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies considerably across sectors. We argue that the size and the wealth of the potential constituency as well as government activity positively affect interest group density. We test our theoretical expectations based on an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of interest groups that registered at the German Bundestag from 1978 until 2013 and show that the number of firms, the wealth of an economic sector, and government activity positively influence interest group density. However, we also find that the relationship between interest groups and legislative activity is reciprocal as legislative activity positively impacts the number of interest groups in an economic sector, but at the same time interest group density also positively affects legislative activity.
@article{kluver_explaining_2019, title = {Explaining {Interest} {Group} {Density} {Across} {Economic} {Sectors}: {Evidence} from {Germany}}, volume = {67}, issn = {0032-3217, 1467-9248}, shorttitle = {Explaining {Interest} {Group} {Density} {Across} {Economic} {Sectors}}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032321718774685}, doi = {10.1177/0032321718774685}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Political Studies}, author = {Klüver, Heike and Zeidler, Elisabeth}, month = may, year = {2019}, pages = {459--478}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Q5GGCF}, dataset = {lobbylist}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2017

Legislative Lobbying in Context

Jan Beyers, Caelesta Braun, and Heike Klüver

May 2017

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The lack of previous research into political interest groups and taking into account policy-specific and institutional context characteristics is largely due to research designs that have been primarily focused on a small number of policy debates, with the result that contextual characteristics were largely held constant. This book brings together articles from different modules that are part of a larger European Collaborative Research Project, INTEREURO, carried out by research teams in nine different countries under the auspices of the European Science Foundation. The main goal of the book is to analyse strategies, framing and influence processes for a set of 125 legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission, in an effort to better understand the involvement of interest organizations in the decision-making process of the EU. Contributors draw on sophisticated and innovative policy-driven samples of interest group mobilization, allowing them to account systematically for how policy-specific and institutional context factors shape mobilization, lobbying strategies and influence of interest groups on public policy debates in the EU. In this way, the book makes an important contribution to the study of interest groups in the EU and represents the breadth of positions taken in the current literature.
@book{beyers_legislative_2017, title = {Legislative {Lobbying} in {Context}}, isbn = {978-1-138-10376-4}, url = {https://www.routledge.com/Legislative-Lobbying-in-Context-The-Policy-and-Polity-Determinants-of-Interest-Group-Politics-in-the-European-Union/Beyers-Braun-Kluver/p/book/9781138103764}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group}, author = {Beyers, Jan and Braun, Caelesta and Klüver, Heike}, year = {2017}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2016

Voting Against Your Constituents? How Lobbying Affects Representation

Nathalie Giger and Heike Klüver

American Journal of Political Science, Jan 2016

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Citizens delegate the representation of their political preferences to members of Parliament (MPs), who are supposed to represent their interests in the legislature. However, MPs are exposed to a variety of interest groups seeking to influence their voting behavior. We argue that interest groups influence how MPs cast their vote in Parliament, but that this effect varies across groups. While lobbying by sectional groups provides incentives for MPs to defect from their constituents, we expect that cause groups in fact strengthen the link between MPs and their voters. We test our argument based on an innovative study of 118 Swiss public referenda, which allows for directly comparing voter preferences with legislative voting of 448 MPs on these issues. Drawing on a multilevel regression analysis, this study shows that interest groups considerably affect the link between MPs and their voters. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation.
@article{giger_voting_2016, title = {Voting {Against} {Your} {Constituents}? {How} {Lobbying} {Affects} {Representation}}, volume = {60}, issn = {0092-5853, 1540-5907}, shorttitle = {Voting {Against} {Your} {Constituents}?}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12183}, doi = {10.1111/ajps.12183}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, author = {Giger, Nathalie and Klüver, Heike}, month = jan, year = {2016}, pages = {190--205}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/29080}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2015

Measuring Interest Group Framing Strategies in Public Policy Debates

Heike Klüver and Christine Mahoney

Journal of Public Policy, Aug 2015

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Framing plays an important role in lobbying, as interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. However, due to methodological difficulties, we have remarkably little systematic data about the framing strategies of interest groups. This article therefore proposes a new technique for measuring interest group framing that is based on a quantitative text analysis of interest group position papers and official policy documents. We test this novel methodological approach on the basis of two case studies in the areas of environmental and transport policy in the European Union. We are able to identify the frames employed by all interest groups mobilised in a debate and assess their effectiveness by studying to what extent decision-makers move closer to their policy positions over the course of the policy debate.
@article{kluver_measuring_2015, title = {Measuring {Interest} {Group} {Framing} {Strategies} in {Public} {Policy} {Debates}}, volume = {35}, copyright = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms}, issn = {0143-814X, 1469-7815}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0143814X14000294/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/S0143814X14000294}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, author = {Klüver, Heike and Mahoney, Christine}, month = aug, year = {2015}, pages = {223--244}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Interest Groups in the German Bundestag: Exploring the Issue Linkage Between Citizens and Interest Groups

Heike Klüver

German Politics, Apr 2015

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Do interest groups adjust their activity in response to public opinion? While previous studies have primarily focused on the link between voters, political parties and governments, interest groups have largely been ignored. This article therefore examines how public opinion affects interest group activity. It is argued that interest group activity is a bottom–up process in which interest groups respond to the issue priorities of citizens. Bringing together panel data on citizen concerns with longitudinal data on interest group issue attention, this article examines the issue linkage between citizens and interest groups in Germany from 1984 until 2010 in two different policy domains. Based on a time-series cross-section analysis, it is shown that issue attention of citizens precedes the registration of interest groups in the Bundestag indicating that interest groups play an important role in issue evolution and political representation.
@article{kluver_interest_2015, title = {Interest {Groups} in the {German} {Bundestag}: {Exploring} the {Issue} {Linkage} {Between} {Citizens} and {Interest} {Groups}}, volume = {24}, issn = {0964-4008, 1743-8993}, shorttitle = {Interest {Groups} in the {German} {Bundestag}}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644008.2015.1024238}, doi = {10.1080/09644008.2015.1024238}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {German Politics}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = apr, year = {2015}, pages = {137--153}, data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Q5GGCF}, dataset = {lobbylist}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Legislative Lobbying in Context: Towards a Conceptual Framework of Interest Group Lobbying in the European Union

Heike Klüver, Caelesta Braun, and Jan Beyers

Journal of European Public Policy, Apr 2015

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We outline a conceptual framework that identifies and characterizes the contextual nature of interest group politics in the European Union (EU) to better understand variation in interest group mobilization, lobbying strategies and interest group influence. We focus on two sets of contextual factors that affect EU interest group lobbying. First, we argue that interest group activities are shaped by several policy-related factors, namely the complexity, the policy type, the status quo, the salience and the degree of conflict characterizing legislative proposals and the associated issues. Second, we posit that lobbying in the EU is affected by institutional factors that vary within the EU political system, such as the institutional fragmentation within the European Commission and the European Parliament and across different national political systems depending on the patterns of interest intermediation or the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers. Finally, we theorize about the interrelationship between contextual features and interest group properties and summarize the findings of the collection.
@article{kluver_legislative_2015, title = {Legislative {Lobbying} in {Context}: {Towards} a {Conceptual} {Framework} of {Interest} {Group} {Lobbying} in the {European} {Union}}, volume = {22}, issn = {1350-1763, 1466-4429}, shorttitle = {Legislative {Lobbying} in {Context}}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008792}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1008792}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, author = {Klüver, Heike and Braun, Caelesta and Beyers, Jan}, month = apr, year = {2015}, pages = {447--461}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Framing in Context: How Interest Groups Employ Framing to Lobby the European Commission

Heike Klüver, Christine Mahoney, and Marc Opper

Journal of European Public Policy, Apr 2015

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Framing plays an important role in public policy. Interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of a policy proposal while ignoring others in order to gain an advantage in the policy debate. However, we know remarkably little about how interest groups choose their frames. This contribution therefore studies the determinants of frame choice during the policy formulation stage in the European Union. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by interest groups as well as contextual characteristics. With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that the frames that interest groups employ are specifically tailored towards the DGs in charge of drafting the proposal. Our theoretical expectations are tested based on a new and innovative dataset on frame choice of more than 3,000 interest groups in 44 policy debates.
@article{kluver_framing_2015, title = {Framing in Context: How Interest Groups Employ Framing to Lobby the {European} {Commission}}, volume = {22}, issn = {1350-1763, 1466-4429}, shorttitle = {Framing in context}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008550}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1008550}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, author = {Klüver, Heike and Mahoney, Christine and Opper, Marc}, month = apr, year = {2015}, pages = {481--498}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2013

Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change

Heike Klüver

Apr 2013

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Why can some interest groups influence policy-making while others cannot? Even though this question is central to the study of politics, we know little about the factors explaining interest group influence. Understanding lobbying success should be of particular concern to scholars of European politics since the European Union constitutes a promising political opportunity structure for organized interests. This book sheds light on the impact of interest groups on European policy-making and makes a major contribution to the study of both European Union politics and interest groups more generally. Klüver develops a comprehensive theoretical model for understanding lobbying success and presents an extensive empirical analysis of interest group influence on policy-making in the EU. The book relies on a large, new, and innovative dataset that combines a wide variety of data sources including a quantitative text analysis of European Commission consultations, an online survey of interest groups, information gathered on interest group websites, and legislative data retrieved from EU databases. This book analyzes interest group influence across 56 policy issues and 2,696 interest groups and shows that lobbying is an exchange relationship in which the European institutions trade influence for information, citizen support, and economic power. Importantly, this book demonstrates that it is not sufficient to solely focus on individual interest groups, but that it is crucial how interest groups come together in issue-specific lobbying coalitions. Lobbying is a collective enterprise in which information supply, citizen support, and economic power of entire lobbying coalitions are decisive for lobbying success.
@book{kluver_lobbying_2013, address = {Oxford}, title = {Lobbying in the {European} {Union}: {Interest} {Groups}, {Lobbying} {Coalitions}, and {Policy} {Change}}, isbn = {978-0-19-163158-0}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/book/11574}, shorttitle = {Lobbying in the {European} {Union}}, language = {eng}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, year = {2013}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Lobbying as a Collective Enterprise: Winners and Losers of Policy Formulation in the European Union

Heike Klüver

Journal of European Public Policy, Jan 2013

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Why does lobbying success in the European Union (EU) vary across interest groups? Even though this question is central to the study of EU policy-making, only few have dealt with it. The small number of existing studies is moreover characterized by a multitude of hypotheses and contradictory findings. This article aims to overcome these shortcomings by presenting a theoretical exchange model that identifies information supply, citizen support and economic power of entire lobbying camps as the major determinants of lobbying success. The hypotheses are empirically evaluated based on a large new dataset. By combining a quantitative text analysis of interest group submissions to Commission consultations with an online survey among interest groups, the theoretical expectations are tested across a large number of policy issues and interest groups while controlling for individual interest group and issue characteristics. The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical expectations indicating that lobbying is a collective enterprise.
@article{kluver_lobbying_2013-1, title = {Lobbying as a {Collective} {Enterprise}: {Winners} and {Losers} of {Policy} {Formulation} in the {European} {Union}}, volume = {20}, issn = {1350-1763, 1466-4429}, shorttitle = {Lobbying as a {Collective} {Enterprise}}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2012.699661}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2012.699661}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = jan, year = {2013}, pages = {59--76}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2012

Biasing Politics? Interest Group Participation in EU Policy-Making

Heike Klüver

West European Politics, Sep 2012

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Does lobbying success in the European Union vary systematically across interest group type? Interest groups lobby the European institutions in order to achieve policy decisions that are in line with their own preferences. While some argue that different types of interest groups are equally able to shape European policy-making, others contend that lobbying success is systematically biased towards some powerful interest groups. The empirical evidence is contradictory as previous studies focused either on a specific interest group type or on a specific policy area so that it is difficult to draw general conclusions. This study therefore presents an extensive empirical analysis of lobbying success across a wide variety of interest groups and policy issues by combining a quantitative text analysis of Commission consultations with an online survey among interest groups. The findings are promising as they indicate that lobbying success does not vary systematically across interest group type.
@article{kluver_biasing_2012, title = {Biasing {Politics}? {Interest} {Group} {Participation} in {EU} {Policy}-{Making}}, volume = {35}, issn = {0140-2382, 1743-9655}, shorttitle = {Biasing {Politics}?}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2012.706413}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2012.706413}, language = {en}, number = {5}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {West European Politics}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = sep, year = {2012}, pages = {1114--1133}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Informational Lobbying in the European Union: The Effect of Organisational Characteristics

Heike Klüver

West European Politics, May 2012

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Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can exert influence on political decisions. However, information supply to decision-makers varies extensively across interest groups despite the common objective to influence policy-making. Drawing on resource mobilisation and organisational theory, a new theoretical framework is developed that identifies organisational characteristics, more specifically the resources, the functional differentiation, the professionalisation and the decentralisation of interest groups as determinants of information supply. These theoretical expectations are tested based on a large new dataset. Using multilevel modelling, this article examines information supply to the European Commission across a large number of policy issues and interest groups by combining an analysis of consultation submissions with a survey conducted among interest groups. The findings confirm the theoretical expectations suggesting that interest groups cannot equally exploit their access to decision-makers, but that resource endowment and organisational structures play a crucial role for effective informational lobbying.
@article{kluver_informational_2012, title = {Informational {Lobbying} in the {European} {Union}: {The} {Effect} of {Organisational} {Characteristics}}, volume = {35}, issn = {0140-2382, 1743-9655}, shorttitle = {Informational {Lobbying} in the {European} {Union}}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2012.665737}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2012.665737}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {West European Politics}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = may, year = {2012}, pages = {491--510}, project_lobbying = {true} }
Die Macht der Informationen: Eine Empirische Analyse von Lobbyingerfolg in der Europäischen Union

Heike Klüver

Politische Vierteljahresschrift, May 2012

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Why are some interest groups able to successfully feed their preferences into the policy-making process in the European Union whereas others fail in their lobbying attempts? This study argues that lobbying success can largely be explained by the information that interest groups supply to the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. What is decisive is however not the provision of information by individual interest groups, but the information supply by entire lobbying coalitions composed of interest groups fighting for the same policy objective. Based on a quantitative text analysis of Commission consultations, the theoretical expectations are empirically tested based on a multilevel analysis of 2696 interest groups and 56 policy initiatives.
@article{kluver_macht_2012, title = {Die {Macht} der {Informationen}: {Eine} {Empirische} {Analyse} von {Lobbyingerfolg} in der {Europäischen} {Union}}, volume = {53}, issn = {0032-3470}, shorttitle = {Die {Macht} {Der} {Informationen}}, url = {http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/index.php?doi=10.5771/0032-3470-2012-2-211}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2012-2-211}, number = {2}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, year = {2012}, pages = {211--239}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2011

The Contextual Nature of Lobbying: Explaining Lobbying Success in the European Union

Heike Klüver

European Union Politics, Dec 2011

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Why are some interest groups able to lobby political decisions successfully whereas others are not? This article suggests that the issue context is an important source of variation because it can facilitate or hamper the ability of interest groups to lobby decision-makers successfully. In order to test the effect of issue characteristics, this article draws on a new, unprecedented data set of interest group lobbying in the European Union. Using quantitative text analysis to analyse Commission consultations, this article studies lobbying success across 2696 interest groups and 56 policy issues. The findings indicate that lobbying success indeed varies with the issue context, depending on the relative size of lobbying coalitions and the salience of policy issues, whereas individual group characteristics do not exhibit any systematic effect.
@article{kluver_contextual_2011, title = {The {Contextual} {Nature} of {Lobbying}: {Explaining} {Lobbying} {Success} in the {European} {Union}}, volume = {12}, issn = {1465-1165, 1741-2757}, shorttitle = {The {Contextual} {Nature} of {Lobbying}}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116511413163}, doi = {10.1177/1465116511413163}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2025-05-09}, journal = {European Union Politics}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = dec, year = {2011}, pages = {483--506}, data = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116511413163}, project_lobbying = {true} }

2010

Europeanization of Lobbying Activities: When National Interest Groups Spill Over to the European Level

Heike Klüver

Journal of European Integration, Mar 2010

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The increasing transfer of competencies to the European level together with the growing heterogeneity of European interest federations puts national interest groups under extensive pressure. In order to guarantee the representation of their interests at the European level, they have to lobby the European institutions directly. However, not all national interest groups do so. This article therefore analyses under what conditions national associations engage at the European level. A theoretical framework is developed, combining resource mobilization theory with rational choice institutionalism. It is empirically tested in a comparative case study of lobbying strategies of French and German agricultural interest groups in the Doha Round. Drawing on a comprehensive survey conducted in 2006/07, this study combines a comparative research design with the new multi‐value qualitative comparative analysis. The main conclusion is that resources as well as the domestic national institutional context determine whether national interest groups Europeanize their lobbying strategies.
@article{kluver_europeanization_2010, title = {Europeanization of {Lobbying} {Activities}: {When} {National} {Interest} {Groups} {Spill} {Over} to the {European} {Level}}, volume = {32}, issn = {0703-6337, 1477-2280}, shorttitle = {Europeanization of {Lobbying} {Activities}}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07036330903486037}, doi = {10.1080/07036330903486037}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, author = {Klüver, Heike}, month = mar, year = {2010}, pages = {175--191}, project_lobbying = {true} }